Introduction
In recent years, Europe has witnessed a marked resurgence of far-right politics. Three weeks ago, Germany held elections for its new parliament, following troubling years shaped by economic recession and debates on migration. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has gained increasing support with each new poll, ultimately securing 20% of the vote, making them the second-largest party after the Conservatives.
Germany is not the only country experiencing a shift to the right. In several countries, including Italy, Finland, and the Netherlands, far-right parties are not only gaining strength but are also part of the government or a ruling coalition. In Denmark, the left-wing Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet) are trying to win back voters by adopting tougher immigration policies, which seems to have weakened the far-right. However, the question of how to deal with the far-right persists.
A look into history shows how the far-right gained power through both normalisation and inclusion, as in Germany, where the Nazis used these tactics to establish a dictatorship. However, there are also instances, such as in Belgium and Finland, where the far-right was excluded from government, preventing the rise of extremist ideologies. After World War II, many countries adopted the consensus that excluding far-right parties from power was essential to protect democracy.
Today, as Europe faces the rise of far-right politics once again, the debate over how to address this shift has never been more urgent. To explore this issue in depth, The Oxford Blue spoke with Tarik Abou-Chadi, Professor of European Politics at the University’s Department of Politics and International Relations.
By exploring how far-right movements have expanded their influence and embedded themselves in mainstream politics, Abou-Chadi provides crucial insights into why many observers are increasingly concerned about the future of European democracy. Whether through strategic collaborations with mainstream parties or through the manipulation of media narratives, the far-right’s impact is proving to be both pervasive and transformative. However, as Abou-Chadi shows, research can help us understand these patterns and, therefore, protect democracy’s future.
In Conversation with Professor Tarik Abou-Chadi
The Oxford Blue: The AfD’s surge in Germany’s recent elections seems to be part of a broader European trend. What makes this development so concerning, and how does it relate to the normalisation of far-right movements across Europe?
Prof. Tarik Abou-Chadi: The fact that this is part of a broader European trend is precisely why we should be concerned. While 20% of the vote is not in itself a direct challenge to democracy, history has shown that far-right movements often don’t stop there. We have seen in other European countries that once these parties gain traction, their influence tends to expand. More electoral success leads to increased pressure on mainstream parties to collaborate with them, whether directly or indirectly. This normalisation of the far-right is where the real danger lies.
Beyond the political realm, the mere success of far-right parties emboldens extremist groups and individuals, leading to increased hate crimes and discrimination, particularly against marginalised groups. This election result is, therefore, not just a political shift—it has real societal consequences.
The Oxford Blue: So, it’s not just about electoral success then, but its wider impact. Given that, in Austria, the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) came very close to leading the government, some argue that integrating far-right parties into coalitions could curb their influence. Does the research support this approach, or is it a myth?
Abou-Chadi: The research is quite clear: Integrating the far-right does not weaken them. There are two main ways this is attempted, and neither is effective. The first is what we call “programmatic accommodation,” when mainstream parties adopt more restrictive immigration policies in an attempt to win back voters. In the short term, this does not diminish support for the far-right; in the long run, it legitimises their positions and strengthens them.
The second approach is “direct collaboration”—forming coalitions with far-right parties or passing legislation with their support. This, too, only serves to normalise them, further embedding their influence in mainstream politics. Historical and contemporary examples suggest that engaging with the far-right does not neutralise their impact but rather legitimises and amplifies it.
The Oxford Blue: This idea of normalisation is critical here. Now, looking at the situation in Germany, what mistakes do you think the mainstream parties made that contributed to this shift towards the far-right?
Abou-Chadi: Elections are influenced by multiple factors, and not everything can be attributed to party strategies. However, a significant issue in Germany has been the discourse surrounding immigration. Over the past three years, the focus on migration, deportation, and the perceived connection between immigration and crime has played directly into the hands of the far-right.
Instead of challenging this narrative, mainstream parties—particularly the Conservatives (CDU) and even the Social Democrats (SPD)—have shifted rightward on immigration, effectively reinforcing the notion that immigration is a problem. This creates a vicious cycle: parties move right to align with public opinion, which then shifts further right as a result of the political discourse. Even progressive parties like the Greens have, to some extent, been drawn into this dynamic.
The Oxford Blue: That shift in discourse seems to have created a difficult cycle. Given all this, do you think there’s a real possibility of the AfD entering government in the next four to eight years?
Abou-Chadi: Predicting politics even a few months ahead is challenging, let alone four or eight years. However, Germany currently remains somewhat of an outlier in maintaining a strong “cordon sanitaire”—a political consensus that isolates the far-right from governance. As long as this remains intact, the AfD is unlikely to enter government. But we’ve seen similar barriers erode in other European countries over time. Whether Germany follows this trend will depend on how firmly mainstream parties uphold their stance against collaboration with the far-right.
The Oxford Blue: So, the future seems to hinge on the political consensus around isolating the far-right. But with the media playing such a crucial role, how would you assess media coverage of the AfD leading up to the German elections?
Abou-Chadi: The media plays a crucial role in normalising the far-right. One way this happens is through the overwhelming focus on immigration—often framed in a way that aligns with far-right narratives. This is particularly evident in how violent incidents involving asylum seekers receive disproportionately more attention compared to those involving native Germans.
Another issue is that media organisations haven’t yet found an effective way to deal with the far-right. They have shifted to treating them like any other political actor, giving them extensive airtime and platforming their representatives on major programmes. Some journalists still seem to believe that asking tough questions will expose these politicians and diminish their appeal. But in reality, this approach often backfires.
The Oxford Blue: Given that, what would the alternative be? Would excluding the AfD from the media entirely be a viable solution, or would that just reinforce their narrative of victimhood, claiming that the establishment is restricting free speech, and so on?
Abou-Chadi: This is a difficult issue, and there is no perfect solution—every approach comes with trade-offs. However, what is clear is that the AfD doesn’t need to be given as much coverage as it currently receives.
For public broadcasters, a reasonable starting point could be ensuring that all parties represented in Parliament receive a proportional share of media exposure. But then guests who regularly use this platform to spread misinformation should not be invited again. Beyond that, media outlets should be more deliberate in how they engage with far-right parties. The challenge isn’t just whether to cover them but how to do so in a way that doesn’t contribute to their normalisation.
The Oxford Blue: The normalisation of the far-right in Germany has not yet progressed as far as in some other European countries. When looking at future strategies, what do you consider a successful approach to dealing with the far-right in Europe?
Abou-Chadi: The far-right is now an established actor in our political systems. There’s no short-term strategy to simply get rid of them—that ship has sailed. The real question is containment: how do we keep them out of power?
Spain is an interesting case where left-wing policies seem to have helped maintain a progressive government while keeping the far-right relatively weak. But that doesn’t mean the situation is permanent. The potential for far-right growth remains, and a crucial factor in containment is the role of the mainstream right. They act as the gatekeepers.
The Oxford Blue: Given all these challenges, do you still have hope for the future of liberal democracy in Europe?
Abou-Chadi: I usually tell people: if you’re looking for optimism, I might not be the right guest.
Until recently, I had never questioned whether I would spend the rest of my life in a liberal democracy. Now, that no longer seems like a given. The reality is that we are facing a fundamental uncertainty about the political systems we will be living under in the future.
However, acknowledging the danger is the first step toward addressing it. If democratic forces recognise the urgency of the situation and act decisively—investing in social resilience, strengthening democratic institutions, and mobilising against authoritarian tendencies—there is still hope. The outcome is not predetermined, but it will require active effort to secure a democratic future.