In the 1980s and 1990s, as the Soviet Union’s slow, grinding collapse gained momentum, the notion of a ‘peace dividend’ began to take shape. This concept emerged in Western Europe and the Americas amongst those nations that had been locked in fierce Cold War competition, which had long demanded full national focus. Simply put, with the demise of the USSR, the greatest single threat to liberal democracy, the political rulebook changed.

There was now potential for governments to cut back on defence spending and redirect resources toward social programmes, infrastructure, or international cooperation. This ushered in three decades of international interconnectedness. The US led a neoliberal charge, relaxing trade barriers, integrating nations into the global economy. Meanwhile, Western cultural exports一particularly in film, TV, and music一 became globally ubiquitous.

Companies were left free to focus on business with no social or international concerns, such as the well-being of their employees or any material threat to the security of their businesses. There was no longer the competitive ideological counter-offer of socialism, which had contoured the shape of popular, private and national decision making for decades. In the words of Francis Fukuyama: the end of history had been reached, and the liberal democratic capitalist world order was government at its most optimal.

That era of relative international calm–notwithstanding regional conflicts and civil wars like in Somalia一began to come unstuck with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Suddenly, the self-proclaimed international guarantor of global security and prosperity invaded a nation in pursuit of narrow ideological interests, namely American superiority. The later revelation that the war was based on faulty intelligence, which politicians lied about, shattered the notion of America as the global policeman, impartially upholding the rules-based order. 

Whilst Saddam fell, the much greater damage inflicted by former President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld began to reveal itself : the autocrats of the world began to feel the chains of international obligation loosen. If America could invade another country, why couldn’t, say, Russia or China? 

What followed in the late 2000s and 2010s was the unfortunate outcome of this slackening of global cohesion. International institutions still existed, but they were no longer the object of international respect, their authority undermined by the disregard shown towards them by their key backer in Washington. Trade continued to spread, increasingly manipulated to serve the interests of certain actors, such as China’s interesting interpretation of copyright laws. The ideal of free and fair trade, without tariffs, regulations or legal tampering, promulgated by the Americans and WTO, became a greater fantasy with each passing year.

But where once powerful bonds of professed international fraternity had guided collaboration on higher-minded issues, including climate action, nuclear non-proliferation, and peacekeeping in countries like Kosovo and Sierra Leone, they were now reduced to little more than a garnish justifying the selfish acts of individual states. Russia was free to interfere in Georgia and Ukraine, while the West responded with little more than strongly-worded yet ineffectual condemnations. At the same time, China began to flex its economic leverage, bullying Taiwan, the Philippines, and other South Pacific neighbours over issues such as the Nine-Dash Line. It built up its influence through the Belt-and-Road initiative in Africa, Asia and South America, reaching into Eastern Europe.

The Americans, too, grew bored of their international dominance. Being the sole hegemon in the world一controlling much of the world’s culture, economy, and foreign affairs一wasn’t enough. They craved excitement. Like children poking a plug socket with a fork, they enjoyed the feeling of ‘danger.’ So they kept running to the edge of the debt ceiling, enjoying the chaos of failing to address internal issues like immigration, gun control, and climate change, whilst tut-tutting at European neighbours for enjoying the protection of the American military. They failed to recognise the dominance this arrangement had secured for the United States since 1945. 

Fast forward to 2016, and these spasms of national self-harm culminated in the election of Donald Trump. The President could only occasionally reveal his isolationist hand in his first term, constrained by establishment figures who believed in preserving the American empire. Yet cracks in the illusion of American commitment did emerge as he threatened neighbours with tariffs and grew belligerent towards China, North Korea and Iran, cuddling up to Russia and sneering at traditional American allies for their supposed exploitation of America’s goodwill.

This international unravelling ultimately culminated on February 24th, 2022. Having long supported the militias which brought down MH17, Putin’s infatuation with imperialism drove him to commit Russia to a three-day ‘special military operation,’ which passed its three-year anniversary. Russia has acted in those areas once ruled by the Russian Empire to support lackeys and incompetents who will surrender to them, whilst the United States has lost its marbles. No longer satisfied with hegemony, America seeks to dominate it一threatening Canada, Panama, and Greenland with the prospect of invasion and the globe with burdensome tariffs.  The developing world faces cuts to international aid and the withdrawal of US support which kill millions, as they are not seen as vital to the nationalist American project. China has sat back and watched with pleasant surprise as its efforts to buy the support of nations through the Belt-and-Road initiative and other projects have succeeded, its competitors have thrown themselves一 unprompted一into valleys of disaster, and the COVID-19 pandemic proved to be only a speed bump on the way to a rejuvenated Chinese international presence.

For Europe, the ‘peace dividend’ is over. The brilliant social programmes and government initiatives which accomplished so much after the end of the Cold War are no longer sustainable. The world is too insecure to leave so little of the budget for defence, nor is trade stable enough for it to guarantee steady revenue. The economic model upon which its prosperity is based is now outdated as the international order unravels. America can no longer be trusted as a reliable ally, with its level of commitment to the world chopping and changing every four years based on the whim of America’s electorate. Defence spending must rise, and hubristic notions about the feasibility of defence without European cooperation must be abandoned. 

There is no help on the way. No one is going to save us this time. There is no arsenal of democracy across some vast sea, ready and waiting to rush Europe’s defence as the United States did in 1917 and 1941. 

Europe is alone. It must prepare for the worst.