Donald Trump’s return to the Office of U.S President has once again shaken the foundations of global politics. From Ukraine to China, Canada to Panama, Trump’s second term promises a tumultuous four years for global politics. Few places is this tumult more likely to be felt than in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Shortly following his inauguration, President Trump set the tone for his administration’s relations with Iran by re-imposing ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions on Iranian oil exports. This strict sanctions campaign was designed to force the country to cease both its nuclear enrichment programme and its support for proxy groups in the Middle East such as Hamas, the Houthis and Hezbollah.
Despite Iran’s initial reluctance to engage in any talks with the U.S., both countries have now entered indirect negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. Though significant tensions remain between the Islamic Republic and the Trump administration, talks have so far been described by both sides as constructive.
This is a powerful development after years of little to no diplomatic progress between the two countries. Following speculation as to what it was that ultimately brought Iran to the negotiating table, many have pointed to these maximum pressure sanctions as the answer.
Yet, a closer look into the dynamics of Iran-U.S. relations reveal a host of factors which are also at play.
Trump’s repeated threats of military action should Iran refuse to negotiate, the new ‘reformist’ government in Tehran, discontent among Iranians spurred by economic crisis, and the ever-looming threat of Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, have all undoubtedly set the stage for the most recent round of talks between the historically hostile nations.
We are therefore left asking: Exactly what role do maximum pressure sanctions play in the novel, yet fragile, diplomatic ground broken by Iran and the United States? And how might these measures contribute to its future?
Sanctions Deja-Vu: The Old New Tactics
To better understand their impact on the current climate of Iran-U.S. relations, it is important to remember that this is not the first time President Trump has attempted to wrestle a new nuclear deal out of Iran using sanctions.
In 2018, during his first term in office, Trump withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) formed by the Obama administration.
The president lambasted it as a one-sided deal, ineffective in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Shortly after, Trump introduced a new maximum pressure sanctions campaign against Iran, aimed at suffocating the Iranian economy, and forcing them into a more favourable nuclear deal for the United States.
While Trump would maintain that he “remains open” to the possibility of negotiating a new deal with the Islamic Republic throughout the remainder of his first term, formal talks between the Trump administration and Iran never materialised. Indeed, in January 2020, following the U.S. assasination of prominent Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, tensions between the two sides only escalated.
Five years on, and following the failure of the Biden administration to secure a new nuclear deal with Iran, Trump has returned to the White House with a renewed vigour for old tactics.
Tackling The ‘Shadowy Fleet’
But how exactly do the new sanctions work? And how are they expected to persuade Iran to strike a new nuclear deal with the U.S?
Picking up where he left off in 2020, Trump has re-asserted his desire to “deny all paths” to Iran developing a nuclear weapon, “curtail its ballistic missile program, and stop its support for terrorist groups”, according to a memorandum released by the White House in February.
To this end, the most recent maximum pressure campaign seeks primarily to “reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero”, enacting sanctions on over 30 persons and vessels purported to be involved in facilitating the transportation and sale of Iranian oil abroad. Within Iran, the heads of the National Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian Oil Terminals Company, are personally identified and penalised by these sanctions.
The impact of Trump’s sanctions will also likely be felt beyond Iran. Several companies operating in the UAE, Hong Kong, India and the People’s Republic of China are also named by the U.S. treasury due to their role in the export of Iranian oil.
Addressing the broad scope of these sanctions, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessnet, asserted that Iran relies on a “shadowy network of vessels, shippers, and brokers to facilitate its oil sales and fund its destabilizing activities” and that the U.S will make use of all “available tools to target all aspects of Iran’s oil supply chain”
This relentless effort to stymie any avenues of potential oil revenue for the Islamic Republic has persisted even after talks between the U.S and Iran have begun. Less than a week after American and Iranian diplomats met in Oman for indirect negotiations, the Trump administration launched sanctions against a China-based oil refinery accused of purchasing over $1 billion worth of Iranian oil.
Trump’s Militaristic Murmurs
So far, sanctions remain the most direct form of action Trump has taken in relation to Iran. However, his rhetoric around future relations with the country should they fail to reach an agreement, hints at the possibility of a far more aggressive approach.
On March 7th, during an interview with Fox News, Trump announced that he had sent a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He claimed that the letter offered to negotiate a new deal on Iran’s nuclear programme, and warned them of the consequences if they refuse.
In the interview, the U.S. president said that he hoped a deal could be made with Iran, as the alternative would be for the U.S. to “go in militarily”, though he did not expand on what such military action might look like.
The president then doubled down on this threat in an interview with NBC, where he plainly stated “If they don’t make a deal, there will be bombing” and that “it will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before”.
‘Finishing The Job’: Israel Aims For Iran
It is not just the threat of military action from the U.S. that may have given Iran cause for concern. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, buoyed by the election of Trump in January, has been an eager advocate for launching missile strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
In 2024, there was an exchange of hostilities between Iran and Israel, with both sides engaging in strikes against the other, amidst the conflict between Israel and various Iranian proxy groups. The 2024 hostilities ultimately did not escalate into full-scale war. However, shortly following Trump’s election, Netanyahu boldly stated that, with the backing of the United States, Israel would “finish the job” against Iran.
However, Israeli military ambitions have been stifled by the U.S-Iran talks as Trump seems to be seeking a strictly diplomatic accord with Iran for the time being.
It is hardly surprising that Trump would seek to avoid another Middle East military quagmire if he can. Indeed, the spectre of the U.S. forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq still haunts the American national consciousness. Over 20 years on from the outset of these conflicts, their unpopularity among ordinary Americans is well-documented, with polls suggesting that two-thirds of Americans believe the Afghanistan War was not worth fighting, and a similar proportion believing that the coinciding Iraq War was a mistake.
Yet, support in the White House for the diplomatic approach to Iran is by no means unanimous, with Trump recently firing his national security advisor, Michael Waltz, due to Waltz’s strong preference for military action against Iran and the ties he had built with Israel over this issue.
It is therefore by no means unfeasible to imagine these factors influencing Iran’s decision to engage in indirect talks with American officials over the country’s nuclear programme. By entering negotiations, Iran can avoid, or at least delay, direct military confrontation with the U.S, whilst also undermining the potential of a U.S backed Israeli invasion.
The View From Tehran: Reformist Woes And Economic Struggles
Within the Islamic Republic itself, every effort has been made to make clear that neither sanctions, nor the threat of military action, was the deciding factor in persuading Iran to enter into negotiations with the U.S.
Tehran’s initial response to the Trump sanctions was overtly negative, with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei designating negotiations with the Americans as “unwise” and calling the U.S. a “bully”.
Whilst addressing parliament, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that “we are at war, the enemy wishes for us to be divided, the enemy wishes for the government, the people and the parliament to be unsuccessful”.
Once the announcement was made that indirect talks between Iran and the United States were due to take place, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the imposition of maximum pressure sanctions and rhetoric of military action had created “serious doubts” over the U.S. government’s ability to enter peaceful negotiations.
This implication that sanctions and military threats could push Iran further away from the negotiating table rather than draw them in, can only be understood by a closer examination of Iran’s internal political dynamics.
Pezeshkian descends from among Iran’s “reformist” political creed. The reformists of Iranian politics are known for their more lenient attitude toward various political and social issues, as well as a greater willingness to engage with the West than their hardline counterparts.
Pezeshkian has echoed this inclination towards detente with the West, asserting that Iran cannot hope to achieve any form of economic growth without seeking some form of sanctions relief. However, the Iranian president’s desire for detente is hampered by both domestic and international obstacles.
Trump’s maximum pressure sanctions, contributing toward the worsening economic conditions in Iran, have severely damaged the credibility of Pezeshkian’s government. In the last few months alone, the president has had to endure his economy and finance minister, Abdolnasser Hemmati, being ousted from office in a vote of no confidence led by hardliner conservative politicians in Iran’s parliament.
Many progressive Iranians have also become disillusioned with the reformist movement, particularly after the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022, as faith in the possibility of implementing significant change from within the Islamic Republic continues to wane.
Together with these domestic struggles, Trump’s maximum pressure sanctions and the constant threat of American and Israeli military action, could ultimately provide enough ammunition for hardliner politicians in Iran to sink any hope of U.S-Iran negotiations ending in a new deal.
And thus, despite the proclamations of those who seek to emphasise the role of sanctions in potentially fostering a new nuclear deal between Iran and the U.S., the Trump administration may find that its economic pressures and military provocations may eventually serve to dampen the prospect of a future diplomatic accord between the two countries.