Across the Black Sea from Ukraine, a country with a shared history of Russian aggression wrestles with the consequences of the invasion.
Along the streets of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is visible everywhere. The blue-and-yellow stripes of the Ukrainian flag hang alongside the Georgian one on public buildings and in the windows of private homes. Near the city of Batumi, a large port on western Georgia’s Black Sea coast, it is painted onto the concrete frame of an abandoned building, as well as adorning the walls of Tbilisi’s cafes and restaurants.
Equally visible, in Tbilisi especially, was anti-Russian graffiti scrawled onto its walls, directed at both Putin’s government and the Russians who have moved to Georgia since the start of the war in February. Almost everyone I spoke to during my six-week stay in Georgia in July and August of this summer expressed strong support for Ukraine and fervent opposition to the Russian invasion.
A History of Occupation and Conflict
This intense feeling of solidarity with Ukraine stems in large part from the two countries’ long shared history of Russian aggression. Georgia, which lies to the south of Russia between the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea, was first annexed into the empire of tsarist Russia in the early nineteenth century.
Three years of independence under a moderate democratic socialist government followed the First World War and the Russian Revolution, ended with the Red Army’s invasion in 1921 and Georgia’s subsequent absorption into the USSR. Like many former Soviet states, Georgia regained its independence in the early 1990s, but has had an uneasy, complex, and often violent relationship with its powerful northern neighbour.
In more recent years, the focal point for tensions between Russia and Georgia has been the fate of two separatist regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which declared independence from Georgia around the time that Georgia broke away from the USSR. Russia has provided recognition and military support for these two regions, which are considered part of Georgia by almost all of the international community.
In August 2008, these tensions erupted into a short-lived but brutal war in which Russian troops occupied much of western Georgia and conducted bombing campaigns on several major cities, including Tbilisi. After the twelve-day war ended, Russia withdrew from uncontested regions of Georgia but still retains a military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, from which thousands of ethnic Georgians have been expelled. In Georgia, considerable effort goes into making tourists aware of the situation. Receipts printed at many Tbilisi restaurants include the reminder, written in English, that 20% of Georgian territory is under Russian control.
Looking Westwards
As a result of this, many Georgians have looked westwards in the decades since independence. While a few people I spoke to this summer expressed regret that the support given to Ukraine by Western powers had not been as forthcoming for Georgia in 2008, almost all welcomed the strength of the western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
At a time when popular opinion of Boris Johnson in Britain was very low, immediately before and after his resignation in July, he seemed a popular figure in Georgia, described as a ‘good man’ by a walking guide I met in eastern Georgia and mentioned with smiles and enthusiasm by many others when they heard I was British. Most people seemed unaware or at least unconcerned by his reputation for incompetence and lack of integrity within Britain, basing their view of him on his staunch support for Ukraine.
Much of the Georgian population identifies strongly with Europe and with Western institutions, a feeling intensified by the war in Ukraine. The EU has provided hundreds of millions of euros of economic support for Georgian development, especially since 2008, funding projects from local agriculture cooperatives and healthcare equipment during the Covid-19 pandemic to wind farms and highways. Polls suggest that well over 80% of the Georgian population have a favourable view of the EU and when I first visited in 2019, I was struck by the number of EU flags flying on local and municipal buildings across the country.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to an even stronger belief that integration into Europe is key to Georgia’s future and necessary to its continued independence. In March 2022, far earlier than anticipated, Georgia applied for membership of the EU alongside Ukraine and Moldova, a sudden consequence of the invasion the previous month.
Popular Opinion vs Government Policy
The decision, in June 2022, to deny Georgia the unconditional candidate status granted to the other two countries was met with disappointment and protests, largely directed against the Georgian government. The war in Ukraine has exposed a number of areas where the views of the Georgian population and its government appear to diverge, ranging from foreign affairs to immigration policy.
Many of the EU’s conditions for Georgia gaining candidate status were linked to government reform, for example, an insistence on “deoligarchisation” and further protection for judicial independence. A few weeks before the EU’s decision on Georgia’s candidacy, the EU personally sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, a wealthy businessman, former Prime Minister, and founder and patron of the Georgian Dream Party, which has ruled the country since 2012.
Protesters in June 2022 expressed fears that the Georgian government was deliberately sabotaging EU negotiations, through actions including insulting EU leaders and targeting opposition campaigners in high-profile arrests to avoid having to implement the reforms demanded by the EU.
Georgia’s government was also noticeably less effusive in its support for Ukraine than the population as a whole. Although exact numbers are unknown, several hundreds of Georgians are believed to have travelled to fight with the Ukrainian Foreign Legion and Georgian support for their own military on social media and in conversation is striking. One young man I spoke to who had considered going to fight in Ukraine said that Georgian contributions to the Ukrainian war effort were in part in recognition of Ukrainians’ support for Georgia in 2008. At a time when many in Georgia felt isolated internationally, Ukrainians were among the most steadfast of their allies.
In contrast to the reaction of ordinary people, the Georgian government’s support for Ukraine has been lukewarm, to the point that Ukraine recalled its ambassador from Tbilisi in March 2022 in protest at the government’s caution in condemning the Russian invasion and introducing sanctions. Although the government strongly condemned a proposal in March 2022 for South Ossetia to hold a referendum on joining Russia, on other issues the government’s views seem out of step with those of most Georgians. This difference led Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to comment that ‘there are times when citizens are not the government, but better [than] the government,’ in relation to Georgian politics.
Russian Immigration
Perhaps the starkest divide between the government and the people of Georgia exists on the issue of Russian immigration to Georgia. Since the start of the war in February 2022, over 70,000 Russians have fled to Georgia, where they have long enjoyed visa-free entry and considerable rights to live and work.
While Russian immigrants are officially considered refugees by the government, the reaction from the population as a whole has been far more hostile. One man, a park warden from the east of the country who owns property, which he rents in Tbilisi, mentioned his belief that recent Russian immigrants tend to drive up rents, but some refuse to pay after a few months.
Several others, all working in tourism, expressed their resentment at being addressed by recent arrivals in Russian, preferring instead to speak English or Georgian. Although many Georgians speak fluent Russian, a consequence of decades of occupation and close links with the country, there is a reluctance to use it and anger at the casual assumption that it can be spoken without asking, seen as a sign of a sense of entitlement or even ownership over the country.
Across Tbilisi, anti-Russian graffiti expresses a strong sense of hostility. While one sign I saw read ‘not all Russians are Putin’, many others exhort Russians to ‘go home’ or at least leave Georgia. However, one man I spoke to said many Georgians distinguished between political refugees, opponents of Putin’s government, and the ‘IT-niks’ from Russia and Belarus who work for western companies and left home to escape sanctions, resenting the latter while welcoming the former.
At a guesthouse in the mountainous region of Svaneti in the north of the country, I spoke to a Russian woman, who disliked Putin’s government and had migrated to Georgia in 2019. She expressed dismay at the political situation in Russia, as well as the practical impact of sanctions on her savings held in Russian banks but said that she was grateful for the continued friendship shown to her by Georgians she knew. She also noted that with her Georgian friends she spoke English, not Russian.
Recent Developments
The time I spent in Georgia this summer was before the recent ‘partial mobilisation’ of reservists announced by Putin in September, but since then movements of Russians into Georgia have only accelerated, reaching several thousand per day at their height.
The scene at the Darial Gorge, a pass near the northern town of Stepantsminda, which forms the main entry point across the Greater Caucasus from Russia into Georgia, reveals much about Georgia’s scarring history and the fraught consequences of recent events. The Darial Gorge marks the start of the Georgian Military Highway, which was built in the nineteenth century to ease the movement of tsarist troops. To this day, it is the main link between Tbilisi and Russian cities north of the border.
Now queues several miles long form near the border, as Russians escape into Georgia. The Georgian government has said it will welcome arrivals on foot as well as by car to ease pressure at the border. When I visited in August 2019, the queues were running the other way. To mark the anniversary of the Russian-Georgian War of August 2008, the Russian government briefly shut the border, demonstrating their arbitrary power to bring trade to a standstill and create disorder. Then, the line of cars building up near the Darial Gorge was designed as a show of Russian strength; now, running in the opposite direction, they act as a reminder of the regime’s weakness.