Today’s article is brought to you in collaboration with Oxford University Polish Society. Check out their election information for this Sunday!
An overview of the past 8 years
This Sunday’s parliamentary elections in Poland have been dubbed by some as “the most important elections after 1989”, when Poles were allowed to vote in what was the first semi-free elections since the outbreak of the Second World War and communist takeover thereafter.
Since 2015, Poland has been governed by the right-wing conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, which has won on a platform of new social policies, focusing on direct financial transfers to families, pensioners, and the poor. That year, the presidential elections were won by the PiS candidate Andrzej Duda, giving PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński a free hand to utilise the state according to his political vision.
One of the first targets of this politicisation of state institutions was the Polish judiciary system. Through a series of bills, some of which went against the Polish constitution, the ruling party has gained considerable influence on the nomination of the judges and officials to the most important legal offices in the country, such as the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court, and the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS), which is responsible for awarding the status of a judge. The reforms sparked considerable international outcry, with the EU initiating their inquiry into the rule of law in Poland, which has deteriorated relations between the Polish government and European Commission.
Despite these unconstitutional judicial reforms alongside a takeover of the public broadcaster TVP, and use of nepotism in appointments to state-owned companies, the party has proved very successful in their communication to voters. Observers argue that the PiS has successfully catered to their base in rural Poland, which had been neglected by the liberal governments of Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz in power from 2007 to 2015. Likewise, the PiS government skilfully utilised their budget surplus owing from economic growth that began around 2015. Although the PiS was accused of ‘buying’ votes through careful targeting of government social programmes at their electoral base, particularly the families and the pensioners, it must be noted that for many lower-income groups the two terms of the PiS government were indeed crucial in alleviating long-lasting poverty.
Two visions of Poland
At first glance the upcoming elections do not differ significantly from the two previous ones in the main parties’ narratives. The PiS projects the vision of Poland as a Catholic country, respecting tradition and honouring those who struggle to adapt to the rapidly changing world, while having a mistrust towards supranational entities, such as the European Union and their allegedly “left-liberal” worldview. The so-called “democratic opposition” led by the largest opposition party, the Civic Coalition (KO), wants the country to be a proactive member of the EU, cherish European values, and aspire to follow the path of development of Western European states.
Yet, more recent developments since the last parliamentary election in 2019 have played an important part in today’s campaign. First is the economic crisis that followed the COVID-19 pandemic. Although Poland was not hit as badly as some other European countries, the government could no longer rely on economic success as a vote winner. Equally important has been the impact of the war in Ukraine, which funnelled the political debate into two main strands: national security and immigration. The third most important factor shaping the debate was the return of former Prime Minister Donald Tusk to Polish politics. After serving five years as the President of the European Council, in 2021 Tusk returned as leader of KO, and swiftly became the main target of PiS political attacks. Through state-owned media outlets, the PiS have made criticism of Tusk’s tenure as Prime Minister a key part of their campaign.
How can the PiS be beaten?
The question of how to oust the PiS after eight years in government has been hotly debated by the supporters of the opposition. Only the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja) was bound to run in the elections on their own. The remaining opposition parties; the Civic Coalition (KO), the New Left, Polish People’s Party (PSL) and Poland 2050, who have dubbed themselves as the “democratic opposition”, were faced with the question of whether to close ranks and form a coalition, or stand for elections independently. Banding together might result in more seats, as Poland’s D’Hondt electoral system favours larger electoral groupings. On the other hand, standing independently would leave voters with a wider choice and would allow parties to be more precise in targeting their respective electorates.
In the end the KO and the New Left decided to create two separate ballots, while the PSL formed a coalition with Poland 2050. Moreover, to the surprise of some, the committee of Nonpartisan Local Government Activists (Bezpartyjni Samorządowcy, BS) managed to register their candidates in all voting districts. Thus, together with the Confederation, there are five national committees running against the PiS.
However, these electoral agreements only apply to the Sejm, the lower chamber of parliament. In the Senate (upper chamber), the KO, the New Left and the Third Way (the coalition of the PSL and Poland 2050) brokered a deal in which all members are running on a joint list. The different choice of strategy than for the Sejm stems from the fact that elections to the Senate are held in single-member districts. This was done in the last Senate election in 2019 and gave the opposition a slim majority in the upper chamber. However, the Senate’s lack of power compared to the Sejm, this victory had little effect on government policy.
A devious double vote
In an effort to rile up the political discourse, the PiS has scheduled a referendum on the same day as the elections, in which the citizens are expected to answer four questions: whether they support the selling of the state-owned companies to the foreign entities; whether they want to raise the retirement age to 67 (from 65 for men and 60 for women); whether they support the dismantling of Polish-Belarusian border fence; and whether they support the relocation of thousands of illegal migrants from the Middle East and Africa to Poland.
The formulation of the questions led many commentators to accuse the ruling party of using the referendum to target its opponents, particularly Donald Tusk. Presented in the state-owned media as an agent of both Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin, the leader of KO has been cast as a national traitor, wishing to sell Polish companies to the Germans, compromising national security, and wanting to reimplement his 2012 reform which raised the retirement age. Although the referendum is likely to be invalid due to not meeting the minimum participation rate of 50%, as supporters of the opposition have called for its boycott, some commentators warn that it might sway some undecided voters.
Who will form the next government?
Undecided voters will be crucial to the winner of Sunday’s election, as polls suggest the PiS and the opposition are neck and neck. According to a survey conducted between 6th and 10th October by the Ipsos agency, PiS would get 36%, KO 28%, Confederation 9%, the Third Way 8%, the New Left 8% and BS 2%.
Even though the PiS is very likely to win the most seats, it remains doubtful whether the party will have enough MPs to form a stable majority government. On the other hand, it is equally uncertain whether the “democratic opposition” will be able to achieve this as well. If neither of the two main blocks gets the required 231 seats in the Sejm, the blocs in the Sejm are likely to experience a stalemate, as Sławomir Mentzen, the leader of the Confederation, has declared that his party will not form a coalition, unless they are offered some of the most important ministerial positions. As the Confederation heavily emphasises its radically libertarian economic program, which is incompatible with the visions of virtually all other parties including PiS and KO, it seems that Mentzen’s party will not become part of any of the to-be ruling coalitions.
Thus, there are three straightforward scenarios of what will happen after all votes are counted on Tuesday morning. Either PiS or “democratic opposition” form a government, or we reach a stalemate, in which no majority government can be formed. In the latter case, what will follow will be either a minority PiS government, or a snap election, most likely in early spring of 2024.
One can name, however, at least two scenarios, which could potentially lead to PiS managing to form a majority government and thus rule for the third term in a row. The first one occurs if the Third Way does not exceed the electoral threshold, which for coalitions stands at 8%, rather than at 5%, as for all other committees. Should this be the case, seats that might have been allocated to Third Way will most likely be transferred to PiS due to the way the D’Hondt method works, possibly enabling PiS to leap just over 231 MPs. The second scenario might happen if PiS lands just a few seats short of a majority. In the previous parliamentary session a few MPs joined the Law and Justice party after being promised ministerial posts. One can imagine a similar arrangement particularly among the electees from the Confederation, many of whom will not have much political experience.
The road ahead
Although many fear that a third term for the PiS will lead to further conflicts between Poland and its European partners, and possibly to a “Polexit”, this last threat does not seem to be plausible. The party might engage in its anti-EU rhetoric, but with support for staying in the EU remaining stable at over 70% as of July 2023, there is no social debate about Poland’s departure.
What would most likely happen would be a further erosion of the state’s institutions, which have been taken over by allies of the PiS. These elections might also be the last to fix Poland’s judiciary, leading not only to improving relations between Poland and the European Commission, but also the functioning of the highest judicial offices, which were crippled by the reforms of 2016-2017. Finally, without a strong position in the European Union, Poland’s voice will not be heard as powerfully as it should be in negotiations surrounding the potential extension of the EU, including Ukraine, scheduled for around 2030. Proactivity in those talks would be all the more important, as they would most likely involve drafting a new treaty, laying foundations for the “four-speed” Europe, as sketched out in the recent report presented in September by the ministers of foreign affairs of Germany and France.
The elections on the 15th of October are not only important for the future of the country, but also that of the wider region. They will determine whether Poland will continue to follow the route of Orban’s Hungary, or if it will become the first to turn against the rising tide of the right-wing movements currently taking hold across Europe from Italy to Slovakia to France and Germany. Much rests on the outcome of Sunday’s election, and the result lies in the voters’ hands.
Comments are closed.