Navigating AUKUS: Implications for ASEAN and the French Factor in the Indo-Pacific

On 16 September 2021, I experienced a significant departure from the usual routine. It was a day I had anticipated as a time of rest, as the Malaysian Embassy in Paris, where I was posted at, traditionally closes its doors to observe Malaysia Day. However, this particular 16 September held a distinct air of unpredictability. The previous day, on 15 September 2021, the world had witnessed the announcement of AUKUS, an alliance that sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles. Napoleon was right – news travels fast in Paris.

I begrudgingly found myself abruptly pulled away from my anticipated day of leisure. The unfolding drama surrounding AUKUS demanded my full attention, as both my ambassador and the capital were breathing down my neck for updates. My Whatsapp notifications went mad for a brief moment, as messages from fellow diplomats wishing me and my country well for Malaysia Day were summarily followed by “BTW – thoughts on AUKUS?” As much as I wanted to give a Hermione-esque reply (I’m not an owl!) I was obliged to reply and convey my government’s position (being concerned about a potential arms race with the backdrop of increasing tension in the region), and in turn convey the French government’s position to my capital.

Napoleon was right – news travels fast in Paris.

The unveiling of the trilateral pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles in Paris. President Macron, who prided himself as a strategic thinker who would guide France to glory, was humiliated. Facing severe criticism over his domestic policies, he was hopeful to fall back on his “foreign policy of grandeur” to beef up his popularity. With AUKUS, this plan was in shambles. Day and night the opposition brayed on the TV and radio. The Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drien, looked ruddy and stern in his press engagements. “Betrayal” was the word à la mode. France, a country known for its grand posturing and strategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, was left in a state of consternation. 

The ASEAN “cabal” was activated as the Elysée immediately sought out ASEAN ambassadors to convey their continued commitment towards the Indo-Pacific region, highlighting France’s cognisance of the importance and centrality of ASEAN. This was preceded by what an ASEAN colleague referred to as “a long diatribe against a betrayal of friends”. 

The AUKUS deal not only brought an abrupt end to the Franco-Australian Future Submarine Programme (FSP), but also posed significant challenges to the transatlantic Indo-Pacific alliance that France, under President Macron’s leadership, had been eagerly nurturing. It meant not only that Australia would switch from French diesel-powered submarines to American nuclear submarines, but also that a powerful new three-way security alliance would be formed to develop novel technologies for the Indo-Pacific region. 

More broadly, AUKUS marked a new alliance; an axis within the Indo-Pacific. And France was not only cut out from the deal, but totally excluded from the alliance. Seeing itself as a nuclear power and thus a major player in the Indo-Pacific, France felt not only anger but also a sense of national humiliation at being left out. Moreover, considering the longstanding rivalry between France and the UK, the inclusion of the UK in the AUKUS pact added salt to the wound. 

More broadly, AUKUS marked a new alliance; an axis within the Indo-Pacific. And France was not only cut out from the deal, but totally excluded from the alliance.

Having three English-speaking countries sidelining the French ratcheted up “anti-anglicisme” sentiments among the French political elite. “La Trahison d’AUKUS” led to the recalling of French ambassadors from, and arguably the first rupture between, France and the US. This is historic, considering that Franco-American relations are often traced to the day Louis XVI decided to financially support the American War of Independence.

While the immediate focus at the time rested on the rupture between France and Australia, it was (and remains) essential for me and fellow diplomats from the ASEAN region to analyse and understand the broader implications of this rift on our part of the world.

For one, we went from a mere side note in France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy to their “partenaires de confiance” or “trustworthy partners” almost immediately after AUKUS was announced. Indeed, it felt as if we went from “vouvoyer” to “tutoyer” overnight with the French. Promises of stronger partnership were made (albeit falling short of legally binding commitments). It was an exciting time to be an ASEAN diplomat in Paris – as we suddenly found ourselves surrounded by bosom friends. One senior ASEAN diplomat in Paris drily commented that “ASEAN is now a damsel to be wooed at a ball. The suitors have promised many things and whispered endless sweet nothings into our ears. Yet our hand remains ring-free and the bride price has yet to be paid!”

Indeed, while it is certainly exhilarating to be courted in a quick tempo sarabande, it also means that one’s feet have to be nimble enough to dance with more than one interested partner. A single misstep by one dancer will easily cause other dancers to fall. If, for instance, one country decides to pursue a unilateral action or diverge from the agreed-upon norm or tempo, this misstep can have ripple effects, leading to a breakdown in regional stability and hampering collective efforts to address shared challenges, such as maritime security or territorial disputes. The bride is caught between warring suitors. The sarabande party is dismissed; the architecture of regional security crumbles. 

The bride is caught between warring suitors. The sarabande party is dismissed; the architecture of regional security crumbles 

Mingjiang Li’s insightful analysis of ASEAN’s responses to AUKUS sheds light on AUKUS’ potential implications for the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. As ASEAN countries grapple with the aftermath of this monumental shift in the geopolitical landscape, they find themselves at a critical juncture, closely monitoring further developments and carefully considering the ramifications for their own security and other interests. 

Some countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have expressed concerns about the militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region and the potential for AUKUS to exacerbate tensions and instability. Others, such as Singapore and Vietnam, have taken a more positive view, arguing that the deal could help to balance China’s growing power in the region. Regardless of their respective positions, it is clear that all countries in the region agree that the deal has the potential to significantly alter the regional security landscape, for better or for worse.

Increased militarisation of the region

AUKUS could lead to the increased militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region by prompting other countries in the region to bolster their own defences in response to the perceived threat posed by China. China itself may seek to acquire nuclear-powered submarines of its own. This could lead to an arms race, which could escalate tensions in the region, destabilise it, and make it more prone to conflict as countries compete for military supremacy. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have expressed concerns about this possibility.

Exacerbated tensions and instability

AUKUS could exacerbate tensions and instability in the Indo-Pacific region as the deal could be seen by China as a challenge to its interests in the region. For one, the region is home to some of China’s largest trading partners, and it is also a major source of raw materials for China’s economy. Having countries that have continuously expressed their “concerns” about you ganging up together is certainly discomforting. China could respond by increasing military activity in the region, which could have a further destabilising effect. 

This view is shared by both Malaysia and Indonesia. However, both countries are also increasingly annoyed by the West’s not-so-subtle pontification to be wary of China. They have balanced both Western (particularly the US) and Chinese interests, avoiding taking sides in the strategic rivalry between the two countries. 

On the other hand, countries that have pinned their strategic stars with the West, such as Japan and South Korea, are unequivocally supportive of AUKUS.

China’s reaction was tantamount to what RAND Corporation described as “railing”. The country has condemned the AUKUS deal, calling it “severely damaging” to regional peace and stability. It has also warned that it will take “necessary measures” to protect its interests in the region. This suggests that China is willing to take a more assertive stance in the region in response to AUKUS.

Increased cooperation and dialogue

However, not all is doom and gloom with AUKUS. Despite the potential for increased militarisation and tensions, the AUKUS deal could also lead to increased cooperation and dialogue among regional actors. The deal could create a sense of urgency among regional countries to work together to address the challenges posed by China, leading to increased cooperation in security, trade, and economic development.

For example, Japan and South Korea have expressed support for the AUKUS deal. These countries are concerned about China’s growing military power and its increasing assertiveness in the region. Like several other countries in the Indo-Pacific, they believe that the AUKUS deal could help to deter China from taking aggressive actions in the region.

AUKUS could also increase cooperation between the US and ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries have long been concerned about China’s growing power and its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. How they express this, and their levels of consternation however differ vastly from one country to the other. As all signatories of AUKUS are ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners, AUKUS may offer itself to complement ASEAN’s vision of its own defence.

Yet AUKUS also invokes a certain anxiety among some ASEAN countries which fear being caught in the crossfire of competition between great powers. Furthermore, AUKUS has been criticized for undermining the international norms and rules on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly the region-specific Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty). It has also raised questions about the role of nuclear weapons in regional security. Some analysts have argued that the deal may prompt countries in the region to reignite their own nuclear ambitions, again potentially leading to a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific. 

The importance of France

Speaking of nuclear – we should not forget France. France has been a key player in the Indo-Pacific region for centuries. The country has a number of overseas territories in the region, including New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna. What it does next in response to AUKUS will have important implications for ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific.

As a world power with multiple interests in the Indo-Pacific, and possibly slighted by being excluded from AUKUS, it may seek to reposition itself in a manner befitting a nuclear state. Between 1966 and 1996, France conducted 210 nuclear tests in the South Pacific, mostly in the French territory of French Polynesia, at a number of different locations including the Moruroa and the Fangataufa Atolls. These tests generated much controversy at the time. While France now may not seek to repeat them or build its nuclear presence in the country, being excluded from AUKUS may lead France to strengthen its overall military presence in the region and deepen its defence ties with nearby countries such as India and Japan.

Politically, France is concerned about the rise of China, which is increasingly asserting its power in the region. Yet it is equally adamant in distancing itself from Washington’s influence and leading Europe to achieve strategic autonomy. As AUKUS has raised concerns in France that the US is pre-emptively sidelining its European allies in the Indo-Pacific, we may see a renewed push by France to further promote its economic interests in Indo-Pacific nations, which comprise a significant market for French goods and services.

ASEAN countries have closely observed the developments surrounding AUKUS, particularly in light of the impact it may have on existing geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN leaders have also taken note of the French reaction towards the deal. While AUKUS members have mended their fence with France, the French element remains an important factor in the grand scheme of affairs in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN nations must carefully navigate these dynamics to ensure regional stability, foster dialogue and cooperation among all stakeholders, and promote a balanced and inclusive approach to regional security.

As the week began to cool down, I decided to take a stroll by the River Seine to let off some steam. During that long stroll, I passed by two major landmarks which had been meant to etch the Franco-US relationship in permanence: the statue of Thomas Jefferson in the 7th Arrondissement, and the quarter-scale replica of the Statue of Liberty standing mightily on the southern end of Île aux Cygnes. Well, Palmerston has again been proven correct.